Abstract. Validation of Bitcoin transactions rely upon the successful execution of scripts written in a simple and effective, non-Turing-complete by design language, simply called SCRIPT. This makes the validation of closed scripts, i.e. those associated to actual transactions and bearing full information, straightforward. Here we address the problem of validating open scripts, i.e. we address the validation of redeeming scripts against the whole set of possible inputs, i.e. under which general conditions can Bitcoins be redeemed? Even if likely not one of the most complex languages and demanding verification problems, we advocate the merit of formal verification for the Bitcoin validation framework. We propose a symbolic verification theory for of open SCRIPT, a verifier tool-kit, and illustrate examples of use on Bitcoin transactions. Contributions include 1) a formalisation of (a fragment of) the language; 2) a novel symbolic approach to SCRIPT verification, suitable, e.g. for the verification of newly defined and non-standard payment schemas; and 3) building blocks for a larger verification theory for the developing area of Bitcoin smart contracts. The verification of smart contracts, i.e. agreements built as transaction-based protocols, is currently a difficult to formalise and computationally demanding problem.
Introduction
The Bitcoin framework [15] enable monetary transactions of a virtual currency amongst untrusted individuals. The construction relies on a novel interpretation of distributed consensus for the validation of a decentralised ledger recording the Bitcoin transactions. Interestingly, the validation of transactions in terms of their correctness, e.g. no double spending and proper ownership of the virtual coins, is demanded to the successful execution of cryptography-fenced scripts associated to transactions. Replicated execution of scripts is supported by a network of peers, whose consensus guarantees the validity of transactions.
Striving for correctness, robustness and efficiency in such an unconventional and constrained execution model, the scripting language SCRIPThas been designed according to minimality principles, e.g. it is not Turing complete, has no recursion, cycles or procedure calls, has an execution cost proportional to the length of the code, and "dangerous" operations like MUL are not allowed. However, even if most transactions exploit standard payment schemes based on simple scripts believed to be robust, free and more complex payment schemas are allowed, new standard schema can be introduced, and, interestingly, a whole area of protocols and smart contracts based on transactions are being developed [6, 14] .
Despite the apparent simplicity of SCRIPT in itself, such a scenario calls for formal verification of critical scripts validating financial transactions, which in the case of Bitcoin alone have a market cap of about 100B USD (2018 -about half the GDP of a country like Greece).
The general validation schema is composed by two scripts, an input script in charge of providing data and credential to authorise the transaction, and an output script, whose structure basically defines the validation scheme and is in charge of checking that the data provided do actually enable the transaction.
We address the problem of the satisfiability of "open" output scripts, i.e. under which general conditions an input script exists capable of providing the right information to let the output script successfully terminate and the transition be validated?
Although the simulation and execution of closed scripts present no problems and many tools and simulators are available, we observe that verification frameworks for satisfiability of open scripts are not so widespread and we believe that there are opportunities for further research in the area.
We introduce a symbolic verification framework which simulate the execution of an output script accumulating minimal constraints, akin to a lazy evaluation approach, for its successful termination. For each successful symbolic simulation, these constraints, if satisfiable, specify one (or more) possible input script that can provide enough information to redeem the transaction.
The contributions of this paper are: (1) a (yet to be completed, but including major constructs) formal description of the SCRIPT language, which has been mostly presented informally and by code releases. We have focussed on salient features for the correctness of validation, often digging in the code for clarity;
(2) the novel, to the best of our knowledge, symbolic framework allowing us to derive a correct and (ongoing research) complete specification of all the possible, and possibly unintended, ways to redeem transactions. Beyond the simplicity by construction of SCRIPT, complex "non-standard" payment schema can and have been provided, worth being clearly analysed. Besides, new payment schemas can be defined and accepted as standard by the community, for instance to overcome existing limitations, similarly to P2PkH improving over the P2Pk schema. In such cases, a clear understanding of the implications of the schema in use and the novel ones is desirable; (3) valid transactions are being used to define more articulated protocols in the context of smart contracts over the Bitcoin blockchain, e.g. self-enforcing agreements in the form of executable code [16] . We envisage the framework here presented as a building block of a larger verification framework aimed at the extra level of complexity introduced by smart contracts, whose verification is currently a difficult to formalise and computationally demanding open research problem. It is worth reminding how this area is prone to "simple", and supposedly well-understood, security failures, which easily lead to consistent financial loss, e.g. the recent overflow-based case of the Parity wallet [13] .
In this paper we introduce the symbolic verification framework, SCRIPT ANAL-YSER, an open source application supporting the presented symbolic verification, and discuss two examples of non-standard transactions appeared in the Bitcoin blockchain, which are slightly more complex than a typical standard payment schema, and, we believe, illustrate how the proposed symbolic verification can support a better understanding of the solidity of Bitcoin's validation machinery.
For the sake of space, while we strived for a comprehensive presentation, a fully formal presentation is demanded to a forthcoming extended paper.
Bitcoin's blockchain and transactions
A quick review of the most relevant aspects of the design of Bitcoin are recapped here. The interested reader is referred to the SOK paper [10] for details.
The Bitcoin blockchain consists of a data structure implementing a distributed ledger. This can be understood, informally speaking, as an append only, and therefore immutable, list of blocks of data maintained by a peer-2-peer network. The blockchain is freely accessible and anyone can be a node (Bitcoin is a permission-less blockchain). Each node stores an identical copy of the ledger. Main innovation is that the ledger is decentralised, i.e. the responsibility for certifying the correctness of the ledger is shared amongst all the nodes, no one being in charge, and guaranteed by a cryptographicallysupported distributed consensus, currently the proof-of-work. The whole network guarantees correctness, and at least half of the computational power in the network is needed in order to alter the ledger.
The ledger records payments amongst accounts, i.e. addresses, based on PKI: the address can be derived from the public key and the private key is used to prove ownership of the address and the crypto-money therein.
Transactions move Bitcoins from one address to another. Each transaction has potentially multiple inputs, i.e. it draws Bitcoins from multiple addresses, and delivers the drawn Bitcoins over potentially multiple outputs, i.e. pays multiple recipient addresses. Once moved into an address, Bitcoins are redeemable by a suitable subsequent transaction. Each input of a subsequent redeeming transaction needs to provide suitable credential in order to "spend" Bitcoins. This is done by an input script, or SigScript, whose execution provides credentials, which are then validated by the output script associated to the output of the previous transaction. The format of the output script is, in principle, free, although a few standard output scripts are commonly used. The successful execution of the input and then output script makes the transaction valid and it can be recoded on the ledger.
Bitcoin architecture uses hash functions, i.e. a mapping from an unbounded domain to a fixed domain, which is straightforward to compute but practically impossible to invert. An hash if often used to prove properties or validate a piece of information. Also digital signature are used, based on public key cryptography. A signature, used to validly sign a message, proves that the signer authorized this message. Alteration of the message invalidates the signature. Generating a valid signature is straightforward, when owing the private key, generally infeasible otherwise. Verifying the validity of the combination of signature, public key and message is straightforward.
Delmonino et-al [12] , and Bartoletti and Pompianu [7] , empirically analyse common patterns in designs of smart contracts. The authors show that some of the design patterns, though they are commonly applied, are actually undesired practices due to high odds of bug introducement. Increased risk of faults in (smart) contracts decreases their trustworthiness, as any fault possibly enables unexpected side effects (e.g. enabling a malicious party to claim, i.e. steal, honestly invested currency). As such, these results highlight the importance of improving smart contract design and verification practices.
Delgado-Segura et-al [11] present a tool (STATUS) for analysing Bitcoin's set of unspent transaction outputs (or UTXO). They present results from running this tool on the UTXO at block 491,868 of Bitcoin's blockchain (appended at October 26th, 2017). The UTXO was introduced to improve efficiency of validating new transactions. STA-TUS's main purpose is to analyse efficiency of the UTXO implementation approach, whereas our work aims to enable verification of certain properties of output SCRIPTs.
Andrychowicz et-al [6] introduce some interesting smart contracts and show through application of formal models that they are applicable in Bitcoin's ledger. In [5] they extend on this with a framework that captures the possible interaction sequences that may occur following a smart contract. Specifically, their approach enables automatic security verification by manually modeling the smart contract using timed automata. We propose a method which possibly enables automatically deriving a model, e.g. expressed in timed automatas, from only the output SCRIPTs of transactions. A generated model may then be further analysed, e.g. automatically following the approach in [6] .
Lande and Zunino [14] propose a formal model to express smart contracts. They then use this formal model to survey and compare the smart contracts currently employed via Bitcoin's ledger. Furthermore, they propose designing bitcoin SCRIPTs using a high level language DSL that can guarantee security. We on the other hand attempt to derive security properties directly from the SCRIPT. Ultimately our goals, to increase quality of smart contracts, are similar however.
Bartoletti and Zunino [8] present BitML, a first high level DSL for designing smart contracts that are applicable through Bitcoin's ledger. The symbolic expressions that form an instance of BitML are easier to analyse than a Bitcoin's SCRIPT instance. Furthermore, they show that these BitML instances can be compiled to Bitcoin SCRIPTs.
Bhargavan et-al [9] propose verifying smart contracts written in Solidity (Ethereum's [17] primary smart contract language), by first either compiling Solidity code to F*, or decompiling EVM (Ethereum's virtual machine) bytecode to F*. It is then possible to verify whether the F* smart contract variant meets certain criteria by embedding these criteria into F*'s type and effect system.
SCRIPT -a fragment of
The validation of Bitcoin transactions reverts to the successful execution of two programs: an input script associated to the redeeming transaction, and an output script associated to a corresponding unspent output offered by an earlier transaction. Although the two scripts can be, and in some cases have been, freely defined, the intended behaviour is that the former provides credentials proving the ownership of the unspent coins, and the latter verifies them. The successful execution of the sequential composition of the two scripts validates the redeeming transaction, that can hence be accepted as valid and included in a block. The script programming language consists of a stack-based programming language, called SCRIPT. It is not Turing-complete by design. It does not allow for cycles and has a restricted set of instructions. Furthermore, complexity of SCRIPT is also limited by transaction fees that are typically proportional to the space occupied by a transaction in a block, and hence to the length of its scripts. Successful execution reverts to termination, leaving the stack in a true state.
We provide here an informal description of the semantics of the language. Full details on the language can be found, e.g., in [1] by directly inspecting the source code of the Bitcoin Core client, or in [3] about the semantics of the SCRIPT instruction set, according to the core client's implementation.
The fragment of SCRIPT considered in this paper is described next, starting from the syntax in Figure 4 . A program S in SCRIPT is either a sequence of stack operations (cmd) or the terminated program . Trailing and prefixed are generally omitted or absorbed, respectively. Commands manipulate dynamically typed data on the stack, with automated type coercion. According to the execution model, operations are sequentially executed and may alter the stack by popping/pushing data. Operations may fail on missing data and mismatching or non-coercible types, causing a runtime error, immediately stopping the execution in a failed state. For instance, OP RETURN fails by default, while ADD fails when the top of the stack does not contain two integers. The script succeeds if all the operations are successfully executed, i.e. they do not fail, and the (top of the) stack is true.
Commands are represented by mnemonic codes in Figure 4 , while SCRIPT actually uses numeric opcodes. Our presentation of the semantics also introduces some simplifying abstractions.
Constants operations push data on the stack, e.g. OP TRUE or OP n which push the values T rue and n, and never fail.
Flow control includes a branching command IF S, representing the conditional execution of the program S if the top stack value is true (it is popped when checked). SCRIPT would actually write it as the sequence IF; S; ENDIF. Analogously for the ifthen-else construct IFE. Branching constructs may fail on empty stack when testing the condition, or, in our representation, because one of the commands in S fails. VERIFY pops the stack and then fails if the popped top of the stack was not true. OP RETURN fails and, as a side effect, allows a limited amount of data to be recorded in the transaction, and hence permanently stored in the blockchain.
Stack operators work as expected. DUP and POP fail on empty stack. PUSH adds data on the stack.
SCRIPT operates on a stack with a 520-byte word. A byte stream bs is a sequence of bytes such that |bs| ∈ [0, 520] (| | is the length in bytes of a type), with the empty bs -which, e.g., can be successfully popped from the stack. bs i (bs [i,j] ) represents a byte stream of length i (length in [i, j]), e.g. the result of a fixed-dimension hash operation.
A boolean (Bool) is a sequence of bytes with |Bool| ∈ [0, 520] and 0, −0 and representing F alse.
1 An integer (int) is a 32-bit signed integer with |int| ∈ [0, 4]. is the most generic type (| | ∈ [0, 520]). A key (key) is a sequence of bytes such that |key| ∈ [9, 73] . A public key pk can only be such that |pk| = 65 or |pk| = 33 (compressed). Some operations may have further requirements on keys, which will be modelled in the corresponding semantic rules.
2 3 The type hierarchy is represented by (the transitive closure of) the following diagram, with solid lines for being subtype of and dotted ones representing allowed coercions under the constraint that byte length are respected, e.g. b ∈ Bool can be successfully used as an integer only if |b| ≤ 4. , bs and Bool are actually equivalent, while int and key disjoint. We introduced separate type entities for readability, and this hierarchy might be useful for more strictly typed variants of SCRIPT.
A type B can be automatically coerced to a type A (A B
Boolean operators work similarly, as expected, and fail on lack of data on the stack (any data can be interpreted as a boolean). VERIFY pops a boolean value from the stack, and verifies that it is equal to true. If this constraint is not met evaluation of the SCRIPT fails. Furthermore, the operation fails on lack of data. It is worth remarking here that some operators amongst those that push a boolean result on the stack have a VERIFY variant, the so-called verify operators, such as EQ VERIFY, CHECK SIG VERIFY. These variants are semantically equivalent to appending VERIFY after the original operator. For example, EQ VERIFY is semantically equivalent to EQ;VERIFY.
Cryptographic operators check signatures, multi-signatures and push computed hash values on the stack. CHECK SIG pops a sig key s k and a pub key p k from the stack, and checks if s k is a valid signature of p k combined with the hash of (part of) the transaction's data. It pushes the result of this check, i.e. true or false, to the stack. The non-VERIFY variant fails on lack of data and on type error. Note that performing CHECKSIG without a VERIFY does not enforce prior operations (including those defined by the input SCRIPT) to reach a matching signature check. This is only enforced when the result of CHECKSIG is constrained to true by a subsequent VERIFY operation. CHECK MULTISIG checks the validity of a list of signatures against a list of public keys. First, an integer n sk is popped, defining the number of provided signatures. Then n sk signatures (sks) are popped. Similarly, an integer n pk determining the number of provided public keys and n pk public keys (pks) are popped. As a result, CHECK MULTISIG pushes true on the stack if each signature is valid for a public key combined with the hash of (part of) the transaction, i.e. ∀sk ∈ sks.∃pk ∈ pks such that CHECK SIG on (sk, pk) is true 4 . Otherwise, false is pushed on the stack. The non-VERIFY variant fails on lack of data and on type error. HASH operators pop a value from the stack and push the hash of this value on the stack. Hashes fail on lack of data.
Locktime operators add time constraints to redeeming Bitcoins. We mention them here for the sake of a more complete overview of SCRIPT but do not address them in this work. Example 1. The SCRIPT program DUP;POP;POP;DUP requires a top element in the stack, duplicates it, then pops the two copies, and then requires the presence of a second element initially on the stack and duplicates it.
Example 2. As an example of an unredeemable output SCRIPT, consider the program PUSH 0xFB15AC2030FB; ADD ADD will require two int values, one of which must be pushed to the stack by the input script. Regardless of what stack is left by the input SCRIPT, ADD will always fail on type error as the first value it pops (originating from the PUSH operation) is of type bs 6 , which cannot be coerced to int.
Symbolic evaluation of SCRIPT programs
Given the SCRIPT code of an output script, its execution is simulated from an empty stack. Required data on the initial stack for a successful computation is defined via a lazy approach returning the weakest constraints on data for successful termination.
The execution stack model
A symbolic stack SK is an infinite (in both directions) list of indexed typed data, with indexes in [−∞, ∞] that uniquely identify a position and a datum in the stack:
, with x i a variable used to accumulate constraints on the expected data in the i − th position, and t a type.
Two extra indexes associated to SK delimit the segment of significant data in SK: the head index h identifies the current top of the stack, and the floor index f denotes the first available position where data can be provided by the input script, that is the first position below the current bottom of the significant segment in SK. Initially, each d i is undefined (and irrelevant) and h = 0 and f = 0, i.e. the top element is 0 and the first position where the input script could have added data is also 0. Such "inital" state is called the empty stack and denoted as SK . Note that f can only decrease. Each command may further specify requirements on data by accumulating constraints on the associated variable. At the end of the computation, data of interest will be represented by the constraint store associated to the variables in [f + 1, 0], i.e. the data required to be provided by the input script for successful termination of the output script, if any. Symbolic expressions exp in the stack consist of constants d, variables x i , operations op ∈ {+, −, <, ≤, =, ≥, >, ∧, ∨}: −1, (x0, ), (x0, ) , . 
Symbolic simulation of SCRIPT computations
The possible symbolic executions of an output script S are defined by a symbolic transition system, whose states represent the computation still to be executed and the current state of the associated symbolic state. Commands operate on typed data, type errors cause a runtime error, which stops the execution in a failed state, modelled here as standard as a non-terminal state (not ) with no outgoing transitions. Table 1(right) reports examples of typed operations.
Definition 1.
A symbolic state for a SCRIPT program S is a tuple (S, SK, h, f ), with SK a symbolic stack and h and f its head and floor indexes.
Definition 2. A symbolic transition system for a SCRIPT program S is a relationship between symbolic states, and a constraint store Γ , written as
and read as Γ justifies the transition from (S 1 , SK 1 , h 1 , f 1 ) to (S 2 , SK 2 , h 2 , f 2 ). Γ is a constraint store over the variables x f2+1 , . . . , x −1 , x 0 . → is the transition relation amongst states. Both Γ and → are defined by the structural operation semantics rules in Figure 2 , 3 and 4.
Γ may contain constraints like {(x i , int), x i ≤ 100}: x i is an integer variable whose value must be less than 100. We use juxtaposition of constraint stores for their union.
For the sake of space we do not enter in the details of the definition of the constraint language and solver, as they are standard techniques over the domain of interest.
reads as the program S with the stack (SK 1 , h 1 , f 1 ) can do a computation step, transform the stack into (SK 2 , h 2 , f 2 ), and become the program S 2 , under the conditions in Γ . The intended use of transactions is to define Γ through the semantic rules for a computation step of a given S 1 and (SK 1 , h 1 , f 1 ) .
The union of the Γ s along a computation made of several steps defines the minimal requirements on the initial stack to make that computation happen. Such a union for a successful execution trace defines one (or more) of the possible outputs of the input script that makes the transition redeemable. It is important to remark that one condition for success is that the top of the stack holds true. In order to validate such condition we 1. add a VERIFY operation at the end of the output script under consideration, which will cause the constraint e h = T rue to be added to Γ -see Figure 3 , and 2. resolve successful termination as Γ satisfiability (and script's termination).
Definition 3. Let SK be the empty stack. A successful trace for a program S is a finite sequence
Γ satisfiability means that there exists an assignment γ such that Γ γ, i.e. the grounding of Γ through γ, is consistent. Interestingly, γ defines x f +1 , . . . , x 0 , the stack variables that have been identified by Γ and need to be to instantiated by the input script.
be a successful trace for the script S, i.e. Γ 0 . . . Γ n−1 is satisfiable.
Then there exist a script I and an assignment γ such that Γ γ is consistent, and the execution of I from the empty stack provides the stack Xγ = [x f +1 , . . . , x 0 ] and the actual execution of I; S is successful from the empty stack.
Proof. Sketch! (this proof relies on semantics rule described in the following). We prove the stronger result: if
is a successful trace then exists I such that I; S is successful starting from a ground instance of SK, according to Γ . By induction on the trace length n:
Case n = 1. S consists of the added VERIFY operation (S was initially empty), the only constraint is that I is able to provide a x h = T rue value on the stack, which define I = OP TRUE, and trivially I; S is successful.
Case n ⇒ n + 1. For each single semantic rule r that can be applied to S, let us consider the step
By construction a successful trace for S of length n−1 exists (it goes to and Γ 1 . . . Γ n is satisfiable if Γ is), and by induction I exists such that I ; S is successful. Depending on the rule r applied, it is possible to show that I exists, such that I; S is successful.
Case r = d − push. We take SK as the stack after the execution of PUSH d from (SK, h, f ). By induction, since a successful trace exists for (S , SK , f , h ) of length n − 1, then I exists such that I ; S is successful from (S , SK , f , h ), with SK equals to SK with on top the pushed datum d, and f'=f and h'=h+1.
It follows that I ; PUSH d; S is successful from (SK 0 , h, f ), indeed we will have a suitable ground instance of SK (given that Γ is satisfiable) after the concrete computation of I , the execution of PUSH d will yield (a ground instance of) SK from which we know that S is successful.
Other cases can be solved analogously. hereafter ranged over by A, B, C, . . . . These operations are used by many of the other semantics rules and may define constraints for the constraint store. Worth noting the rule s pop: data is expected (to have been provided by the input script) but the stack is empty: a new symbolic variable x f is allocated in the first available position on the stack, i.e. f , and added to Γ with , i.e. no requirements, as type. Rules for constants and stack ops are straightforwardly, examples are in Figure 5 .2. Arithmetic and boolean ops follow a common scheme: data are popped from the stack and, if types are correct, the result is pushed on the stack. Figure 2c shows the scheme for binary operations, most of which are defined in Table 1 .
Flow control is described in Figure 3 . Rule seq is the core of a small-step semantics: a sequence of commands is unfolded one at the time. ite t checks the value popped from the stack: if it is, or can be assumed to be a Bool according to type coercion rules, then ITE reduces to its if branch under the (minimal) assumptions that the type is a Bool and the value is T rue. Note that, as a general rule, a type error prevents that application of the rule, not allowing termination and therefore a successful trace. ite f follows straightforwardly, as well as the omitted rules for IF, and the (only) one for VERIFY -not Bool or f alse prevent termination.
The crypto ops are in Figure 4 . h256 (and the omitted h160) describes the hashing of the top value in the stack. Similarly, chksig pops a signature and a public key and pushes a symbolic expression of validating the (signature, public key, transaction message) pair. Analogously, chkmsig pops a number n sk , pops n sk signatures, pops a number n pk , pops n pk public keys, pops 1 irrelevant value 6 and pushes a symbolic expression of validating the multiple signatures with multiple public keys to the stack. The former (Γ 0 ) implies that the true-branch of the OP IF instruction is taken, and the latter (Γ 1 ) implies that the false-branch is taken. For both Γ s the input script must instantiate variables {X 0 , X −1 } and X −1 must be a valid signature. If the transaction is redeemed following Γ 0 's constraints, X 0 must be a valid hash input such that the result is equal to some constant byte string and its type is constrained by the Size constraints to: {64,65,66}. Whereas, if the transaction is redeemed following Γ 1 's constraints, X 0 must be a valid signature. Figure 5b shows the output SCRIPT of a transaction 8 that was inserted into the Blockchain's 290,456th block. Again, since both branches of the OP IF instruction produce valid constraint sets, the tool finds two solutions for Γ : For both Γ 0 and Γ 1 variables X −4 , .., X 0 must be instantiated by the input SCRIPT. Depending on the value of X 0 , the true-branch is taken (Γ 0 , when X 0 = true) or the false-branch is taken (Γ 1 , when X 0 = f alse). X −1 and X −2 must be valid signatures for both Γ s. However, note that the public keys they must match with are different depending on which Γ is solved by the input SCRIPT. This shows that there exist two identity pairs that may redeem the transaction. X −3 is in both Γ s popped from the stack due to the bug in MultiSig, and must only be present but is not further constrained. Additionally, in both Γ s, X −4 must be some value equal to true. It can be argued that the inclusion of this constraint on variable X −4 is a minor bug of this output SCRIPT that is caused by the VERIFY variant of MultiSig that is applied as the final operation (following both the true-, as well as the false-branch). Though the trained eye should have no trouble spotting this bug in the code, it is clear that the constraints generated by our prototype tool better highlight the bug's presence.
Conclusions
We introduced a symbolic analysis of open SCRIPTs. An open SCRIPT is an incomplete program, i.e. the output scripts in Bitcoin's transactions. These can be closed by prepending a set of instructions, i.e. the input scripts in Bitcoin's transactions. Through application of the symbolic evaluation rules, the constraints expressed by an output script, which are the ones that must be met by the input script, can be derived automatically, and be further analysed, either manually or (partially) automatically. We have shown that these constraints can, for example, show the non existence of a redeeming input script, e.g. due to type error(s) in the output script, or contradiction(s) in the constraints imposed by the output script. Results have been presented of analyses on two relatively complex non-standard output scripts. Such results have been obtained automatically by means of an open source application that we developed. Such results, beyond confirming that the two output scripts are redeemable, clarify by means of the generated constraints the required encrypted knowledge.
Currently, the evaluation rules and the prototype tool cover a relevant portion of SCRIPT's language. Interesting research for future work involves extending both, e.g. starting by the inclusion of locktime operations. On a longer term, we are planning to extend the symbolic evaluation to the analysis of smart contracts that are defined with multiple linked transactions in conjunction with off-chain communication,à la cryptographic protocol analysis.
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